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ABSTRACT
This paper presents some new perspectives on the structure and
performance of alternative economic organizations. We posit that decision
makers makeerrorsof judgement (for example, they sometimes select bad
projects while rejecting good projects), and that how these errors are
aggregated within different organizations depends on their architecture (for
example, on how individuals are organized together). Using this framework, we
comparethe performances of two polar forms of organizations: hierarchies and
polyarchies.
Assuming judgmental abilities ofindividuals are similar inthe two
systems, we show that polyarchies accept a larger proportionof bad projects
(compared to hierarchies) whereas hierarchies reject a larger proportion of
goodprojects. We then determine the conditions under which polyarchies have
higher or lower expected profit. The conditions under which polyarchies
perform better appear to be more plausible and, moreover, this conclusion
holds also in the case where the rules for accepting or rejecting projects are
rationally determined based on the information available to individuals. The
architecture of organizations also affects their portfolio of available
projects; we determine conditions under which polyarchies have better or worse
portfolios compared to those available to hierarchies.
There are many possible extensions of our approach. Among them are the
analysis of internal structure of firms, selection of managers (by other
managers) and the reproduction and self—perpetuation of organizations over
time.
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Thereis a widespread belief that the internal organization of an
economic system has an important effect on its performance. Yet, there is
very little in traditional economic analysis which investigates such a
relationship.1 In this paper, we present some new ways of looking at economic
systems. We motivate our discussion in the context of economic systems,but
it has implications for the internal organization of large corporations as
well.
The thesis of this paper is that economic systems behave fundamentally
differently under different forms of organization, and thatcentralto an
understanding of the performance of an economic system is an understanding of
its architecture. The architecture (like that of a computer or electrical
system)describes, among other things, how the constituent decision making
units are arranged together in a system (i.e., who makes which decisions) and
who conveys what information to whom. Our attempt is to relate the
architecture of alternative economic systems, along with their attendant rules
for meting out rewards and punishments, to their performance.
The axiom of human behavior which plays a basic role in our analysis is
that alL decision makers makeerrorsof judgment. For concreteness we focus
on simple decisions which involve accepting or rejecting certain projects.
Individuals (or the constituents of economic systems) make these decisions
basedonthe information available to them. In any event, because of the
errorsin judgment, some projects which get accepted should have beenrejected, and some projects which are rejected should have been accepted.
Using the analogy from the classical theory of statistical inference, these
errors correspond to Type—Il and Type—I errors.
The typology of economic systems on which we focus in thispaperarises
from the differences in how individuals are organized together in a system.
We think of a polyarchy as a system in which there are independeat (and
possibly competing) sources of decision making. In contrast;, a hierarchy is
visualized as a system in which the decision making authority is more
concentrated.In Section 1, we present simple (polar) dels of these two
systems.
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Themost important consequence of how the individuals are arranged
togetheris that the aggregation of errorsis different in different economic
systems.The aggregation of errors, in turn, determines the performance of a
system.For example, in a market economy, if one firm rejects a profitable
idea (say, for a new product), then there is a possibility that some other
firm might accept it.In contrast, if a single agency makes such decisions
and this agency rejects the idea, then the idea must remain unused. The same,
however, is also true for those ideas which are unprofitable. As a result,
onewould expect a greater incidence of Type—Il error in apolyarchy, and a
greater incidence of Type—I error in a hierarchy.
It should be apparent, however, that the overall performance of a system
(forexample, its profit level) will depend not only on its architecture, but
also on the mix of projects that is available to its declsioa makers, and on
the nature of errors that the decision making entails.
Initially, in Section II, we assume that individuals make similarerrors
iiithe two systems, and that the nature of errors is exogenously specified.
—2—Moreover, the mix of projects available to the two systems is also
ideriticl. The performance of economic systems is thus attributable primarily
to what we have called their architecture.
We then examine, in Section III, how the portfolio of projects available
to art economic system is influenced by its architecture. This represents more
of a general equilibrium view: the differences in the architecture will
affect the chances that different types of projects have of being accepted or
rejected. This will, in turn, influence the incentives of those who
conceptualize and invent projects, and will thus affect the kinds of projects
which are invented. For example, one would expect that the inventors would
attempt to generate those projects which are more likely to be accepted.
The above analysis takes the errors in judgment (that is, the
probabilities of good projects being rejected and those of bad projects being
selectedbyevaluators) as exogenous, as well as identical in the two
systems.In Section IV, weanalyze an endogenous determination of these
errors.This wedo by determining rational screening rules for project
acceptance, where the constituents in the economic systems take into account
whatever information is available to them.
In this paper, we analyze only one, albeit an important one, aspect of
the architecture of economic systems. Some other important aspects are
sketched out in the concluding section.
I. TUE MODEL
In the following model, a polyarchy consists of two firms, and a
hierarchyconsists of two bureaus. Thetask of a bureau or a firm is to
screenprojects. Each project has a scalar (net) benefit, which can be
—3—positive, negative, or zero. A screen (i.e., a bureau or a firm) evaluates
every project and accepts or rejects the project.
The decision process in a polyarchy and a hierarchy are depicted in
Figures 1 and 2 respectively. In a polyarchy, the two firms screen the
projects independently. For specificity, one may think of projects arriving
randomly (with probability one—half) at one of the two firms. If a particular
project is accepted by a firm, then it is no longer available to the other
firm. If the project is rejected, then it goes to the other firm where, once
again, it can be accepted or rejected. Neither firm screens the same project
twice, so that a project can not cycle back and forth betweenfirms.3 The
portfolio of projects selected in a polyarchy therefore consists of the
projects accepted separately by each of the two firms.
In contrast, in a hierarchy, all projects are first evaluated by the
lower bureau (bureau 1); those which are accepted are forwarded to the higher
bureau (bureau 2) and others are discarded. The projects selected by the
system then are those which pass through the higher bureau. Drawing an
analogy from the design of electrical circuits, the screens are placed in
series in a hierarchy whereas they are placed in parallel in a polyarchy.
Throughout the paper, the superscripts P and H represent a polyarchy and
a hierarchy respectively. Also, for brevity, we use the superscript s, where
s =Por H. Let x denote the net profit (benefit) from a project,4 and let
p5(x) denote the probability that this project will pass through a screen in
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the system.We refer to p5(x) as the screening function. Then the
probabilities that the project x will be accepted in the system s, denoted by
fS,aregiven by
—4—p'1io





(1) f Ep(x) (2 —p(x))
H H 2
(2) f (p(x))
We refer to the portfolio of projects available to aneconomicsystem as
the initial portfolio and the portfolio that it selects as the final
portfolio. For system s, NS denotes the number of projects in the initial
portfolio,gS(x) denotes its pdf, and GS(x) denotes its cdf. The initial
portfolio contains both profitable and unprofitable projects, i.e., there are
6 projects with positive as well as negative x s.
Our interest is iii examining the final portfolios in the two systems.
These can be represented using many different summary statistics. For
example, the fraction of initial projects selected by the systems, denoted by
S is given by
(3) ns =E[fS},
iii which E denotes the expectation operator; the expectation is calculated
with respect to the pdf for the system.
On the other hand, if we are interested in studying the profitability of
alternative systems, then an important statistic is the expected profit. We
denote this by yS, which is7
(4) =N5E[xf5].
One might also be interested in other statistics; we discuss these later.
—5—Screening Function: The screening function p(x) is the probability that
projectswith different levels of profit are accepted by a bureau or a firm.
It summarizes the error making properties of a screen. It can take any form,
provided
(5) 1 p(x) )0,
for all x, andthe strict inequalitieshold for at least some
Two properties of the screening function are of special interest. The
first is its slope, i.e., p(x) = .Ifp(x) is positive then a
project with higher profit has a higher local probability of being accepted by
a screen. If p(x) =0,thenthe screening is indiscriminate, since itdoes
not distinguish between a better andaworse project.
While incertaincases itispossible that the sign of p, changes over
the range of projects, we consider here oniy those screens whichhaveat least
some, but not complete, discriminating ability throughout the range of
projects.Thatis, p >0, forall x. Further, if p and represent two
screens, and ifp(x)>p(x),then we refer to the former screen as locally
more discriminating at x =x.
Thesecond important property of screens is the level of p(x). If
p(x)> p(x), then we call the former screen locally slacker, and the latter
locally tighter, at x =x.
In some cases examined in this paper, we employ linear screening
functions. The corresponding conclusions will approximately hold for all
those screens for which the curvature of p(x) is small. In such cases, p(x)
—6—is expressed as
(6) p(x) =p+p(x —i),
1.' X
whereiisthe mean of the initial portfolio, i.e., u =
andp =p(.i)is the probability that the average project will pass through a
screen. Clearly, a higher p andimplyglobally higher slackness and
discriminating capability.
It is useful here to ask: what is it that the economics literature
typically assumes concerning the screening functions? In the absence of
uncertainty in the outcome of projects (as in the case of the present model)9,
much of the literature makes no distinction between the projects which are
worth selecting, and those which are actually selected. This assumptioa, in
thecontextof the present model, implies that: p(x) =Iif x > 0, and
p(x) =0if x < 0.In this case, the performances of a polyarchy and a
hierarchy are identical in every respect, as can be easil.y verified.
Thus, the architecture of economic systems ceases to be a relevant issue,
if oneassumesthat human decision makingisabsolutely fauLtless. Even a
casual observation of actual functioning of business and public organizations,
in contrast, makesitabundantly clear that errors of judgment are an
inescapabLe feature of human decision making. This reaLization not only makes
it necessary to recast the traditional view of the literature, but it aLso
provides a potential cornerstone for unraveling certain hitherto unrecognized
differences among different types of organizational systems.
II. PORTFOLIOS SELECTEDIN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS
—7--In this section, we investigate two questions. First, how is the
portfolio selected in each of the two systems affected by the exogenous
parameters representing the initial portfolios and the characteristics of the
screens? Second, what is the relative performance of the final portfolios in
thetwo systems, and how is this influenced by the exogenous parameters?
While answering the second question, we assume that the two systems have the
same initial portfolios and screening mechanisms; the differences in their
performanceare therefore solelydue to the difference in their
architecture.This assumption is not required for answering the first
question since it does not involve any comparison across the systems.
The statistics of the portfolio selected which we etamine in some detail
are: the proportion of original projects selected and t (expected) profit
fromthe portfolio selected. We also point out how some other statistics can
be analyzed.
A.TheSize of Portfolios Selected
The proportion of the initial portfolio selected by the two systems,
is given in (3).Denotingthe difference in these proportions by An, we
find that
P H (7) An =n —a> 0, since
(8) fP—fH=2p(x)1 — p(x)} >0,
andit is strictly positivefor somex.
-8-Therefore: A polyarchy always selects a larger proportion of initial
projects than a hierarchy.
The reason behind this result is quite intuitive. Consider a
hypothetical situation in which the second firm in a polyarchy does not accept
any project, whereas the higher bureau in a hierarchy acceptsall of the
projects forwarded to it by the lower bureau. The proportionof projects
accepted in the two systems, then, would be the same, narnely, E[p(x)].It
follows then that the actual proportion of projects accepted inapolyarchy
willalways exceed that in a hierarchy.
In fact, this intuition can be extended further. To see this, let good
(bad) projects be denoted by an arbitrary non—empty set A within the range of
x. Then the screening is completely faultless (erroneous) if
p(x) = 1 for x c A, and it is completely erroneous (faultless) if p(x)=0,
for xA.Now, from (1) and (2), 'A f'gdx > f fHgdx, unless p(x) equals
either I or 0,forxA.
Itfollows that: A polyarchy accepts a larger number ofgood as well as
badprojects than a hierarchy, no matter how one defines good and had
projects, provided he screening isneithercompletely faultless nor
completely erroneous. Therefore, the incidence of Type—i error is relatively
higher inahierarchy, whereas the incidence of Type—Il error is relatively
higher in a polyarchy.
To understand the impact of initial portfolios on the size of portfolios
selected, letrepresent a parameter representing the initial portfolio, i.e.,






—9--where g = ,G=- andfS = andthe last expression in (9) is
as $ 3$ x
obtained by integration by part.1° In (9),f5 > 0, from (1) and (2).




----—= ff [5 G5(z)dz]dx
2 fS where fS = .Usingour assumption that p(x) is approximately linear,
xx 2
we find from (1) and (2) that <0, and fh> o• Thesignsof (9) and
(10) cannowbe evaluated using the standard properties of stochastic
dominance.'' The key results are as follows.
An improvement (worsening) in the initial portfolio in the sense of
first—order stochastic dominance leads to a larger (smaller) proportion of
initialprojects being selected inboth a polyarchy andahierarchy.An
improvement (worsening) in the initial portfolio in the sense of second—order
stochasticdominance leads to a larger (smaller) proportion ofinitial
projects being selected in apolyarchy,auda smaller (larger) proportion
beingselected in a hierarchy.
P H
Theseresults canbe seen in Figure 3.Inthisfigure, f and f are
concave and convex quadratics in x, since p is linear. n s thearea above
the x—axis bounded by the product of fSandg. Naturally, this area
correspondingto fPishigherthan that to fH; andthis areaexpands, for both
apolyarchy and a hierarchy, if the probability weight g(x) shifts from lower
x to higher x.Also, if theprobability weight shifts from the mean to the
two sides (due to a mean preserving spread, for example) then the area






A 0 x1JExplicit expressions for Sarederived intheAppeadix I. From these
expressions, one can obtain bounds on the magnitudes of n,and also one can
ascertain how a5 is influenced by changes in the screening function. As one
cansee in Figure 3: A higher (lower) slackness in screening raises (lowers)
the proportion of projects selected in both systems. We also show that:A
higher (lower) discriminating ability in screening lowers (raises) the
proportion selected in a polyarchy, whereas it raises (lners) the proportion
selected in a hierarchy.
B. Profit in Alternative Systeiis
Probably the single most important indicator of the performance of a
system is its (expected) profit. We begin our analysis o profit with simple
initial portfolios which contain two types of projects; mere general
portfolios are examined later.
Two Types of Projects: Consider an initial portfolio consisting of two
types of projects, good and bad, with respective net profits x and —x2,where
and x2 are positive. The probabilities of passing tLrough a screen are
denoted by parameters p1 and p2 respectively. The initial portfolio
contains a fraction n of good projects. If tY =yP— isthe indicator









The above expression allows us to demarcate the parameters' space ifltO
two regions: one in which a polyarchy has a higher profit than a hierarchy,
and the other in which the reverse holds. To see this in its simplest form,
—11—-first assume that x1 =x2
,i.e.,a good and a bad project have symmetric
gain and loss. The parameters which determine the sign of (11) are
p2 ,andn.
Figure 4 summarizes the results.We are concerned only with the area
belowthe 450line,since p1 > p2 .Nowtake, for a moment, the case in
which the initial portfolio contains good and bad projects in equal
proportions, i.e., n =1/2.Then a polyarchy has a higher profit in the
region ODA, whereas the reverse holds in the region ADB. That is, polyarchy
has a higher profit if
(12) p1 +p2
< 1,
and the reverse holds otherwise.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Recall that a polyarchy
selects more projects, good as well as bad, than a hierarchy. A polyarchy's
profit from good projects is greater, but so is its loss from bad projects.
For a polyarchy to perform better, therefore, its higher profit from good
projects must outweigh its higher loss from bad projects. Now, the expression
(11) shows that a polyarchy's relative profit from good projects is highest
when p1= 1/2, and this decreases when p1 diverges from one—half. Similarly,
a polyarchy's relative loss from bad projects is highest when p2 =1/2,and
it decreases as P2 diverges from this point. Whenweadd the gain and the
loss, then we find that a polyarchy has a higher profit level if (12) iS
satisfied.
If the initial portfolio contains a smaller proportion of good projects,







Aseparated by a hyperbola like OEA, which is inside the region ODA'2. A
polyarchy has a higher profit within the region OEA, and the reverse holds
outside of it. The region OEA shrinks if the proportion of good projects in
the initial portfolio is smaller, and it coincides with the line
OA if a +0.
The opposite case, in which the initial portfolio contains a greater
proportion of good project has a parallel implication. A polyarchy then has a
higher profit outside of the region AFB, and the reverse holds inside it. Not
surprisingly, the two regions OEA and AFB coincide wIth the triangles ODA and
ADBrespectively,as a tends to one—half.
The same figure allows us to interpret the case in which good and bad
projects have different gain and loss, that is when * • A.sis
apparent from (11), a higher x1/x2 leads to a higher relative profit in a
polyarchy, i.e., a higher gain from a good project or a lower loss from a bad
project is relatively advantageous to a polyarchy. It is intuitive,
therefore, that x11x2 plays a role analogous to a.Specifically, the line
AD separates the two relevant regions in Figure 4 if a =x2/(x1
+x2).A
hyperbola like OEA is theboundaryif either a or x1/x2 is smaller than what
would satisfy the last equation. If a or x11x2islarger, on the other hand,
then a hyperbola like AFB is the relevant boundary.13
Whatwefind concerning the screening probabilities, therefore, is that
if p1 is small(andsignificantly larger than p2) thenapolyarchy has higher
profit even if, within a range, the initial portfolio has fewer good projects
and if the gain from a good project is smaller than the loss from a bad
project. On the other hand, within a range of initial portfolios, a hierarchy
has higher profit if p1 is large, and if it is close to p2.
—13--A qualitative summary of the results is as follows. If the Initial
portfolio improves (because of a larger proportion of good projects, a higher
gain from a good project, or a lower loss from a bad project), then the
relative profit in a polyarchy (compared to a hierarchy) improves. The
reverse happens if the initial portfolio worsens. Within a range of initial
portfolios, however, a polyarchy has a higher profit than a hierarchy if the
screening of projects is tight and if it has high discriminating ability. The
opposite conclusion holds if the screening is slack and if it has low
A44...4,-;nrrh414f'it '.1.1.0 ¼. A. .1. UA.A. L.a —, —
AGeneral Project Portfolio: Now consider initial project portfolios
consisting of a spectrum of projects. Recall that the number of projects is
NS.If pS(x) is a polynomial of order m then, from (4), Y8 is a function of
up to 2m + 1 moments of the distribution of initial portfolio. If the
screening function is approximately linear, then
(13) Y =NS4(.i,Ss,s
2 2 . . 3 3 where:o =E[(x—j) I> 0 is the variance and r =—EIxu))/ais the
negative of the coefficient of skewness of the initial portfolio. 4 is the
expected profit per project in the initial portfolio, i.e., 4 =YS/NS
Explicit expressions for are presented in Appendix I. Though these
expressions can be interpreted for arbitrary values of iandn,itmight be
useful to hypothesize about the relevant range of these parameters. Common
experience suggests that the world is full of unprofitable ideas, whereas
profitable ideas are quite scarce. Also, the (net) profit that can be
typically made from even the best project is limited. In contrast, the losses
—14—from those projects which are truly the worst can be much larger.It ía
reasonable therefore to asstnie that the mean and the skewness of the universe
of projects are nonpositive. That is,
(14a) i<0, and
(14b) r > 0.
The relative profit level is gIven by (see Appendix 1)14
(15) =2Ni[p(1
-p)— +2NE(1— +p2
The sign of the above expression depends critically on p which, it should be
recalled, is the probability that the average project (which according to
(14a) has a nonpositive profit) will pass through a screen. For brevity in
exposition in what follows, we call the screening tight if p < 1/2.We
note the foLlowing qualitative results.
First, the intuition developed in the earlier section concerning the
screening function is confirmed in the present case as well. Specifically, a
greater tightness or a greater discriminating ability in screens corresponds
to a higher relative profit in a polyarchy, provided the screening is tight.
Second, we obtain some new insights concerning the initial portfolio: A
larger negative skewness in the initial portfolio implies a higher relative
profit in a polyarchy. Also, a larger variance implies a higher relative
profit in a polyarchy, provided the screening is tight.
Third, we note some of the circumstances in which the profit level in a
—15—polyarchy is greater or smaller than that in a hierarchy.It is obvious from
(15) that if the screening of projects is indiscriminate, then the profitin a
polyarchy can not be larger than that in a hierarchy.
Therefore: For a polyarchy to have a greater profit than a hierarchy, it
is necessary that the screens should have some discriminating ability.
Further, a polyarchy has a lower profit if the inItIal portfolio is
symmetric and the screening is slack. On the other hand, a polyarchyhas a
higher profit if the mean of the initial portfolio is close to zero,and if
the screening is tight.
C.Other Characteristics of Portfolios Selected
Obviously,additional summary statistics might beof some interest in
comparingthe overall performance of the two systems. Amongthese are the
meanand the higher moments of the final portfolios. To obtain these, let
h5(x) denote the probability thataproject with profit x is among the
projects selected in system s. Then from Bayes' theorem
(16) hS(x) =fS(x)g(x)
Moments of the final portfolios can be derived using the above pdf.
For example, the mean of the final portfolio in the system s is




—16—is the covariance between x and fs(x). Variance and other higher moments of
the final portfolios can be obtained similarly.
Note that the covariance (18) is positive because p(x) is positive and,
therefore, x and fSarepositively related. Thus: the final portfolios in
both a polyarchy as well as in a hierarchy have higher means than the means of
their initial portfolios. This happens because both systems improve upon
their initial portfolios due to the discriminating ability of theirscreens.'5
III•INVENTORS'INCENTIVES
A..Deterainants of the Initial Project Portfolio
Thusfar we have taken the initialportfolioas given, and examinedhow
the performance of economic systems is affected by exogenous changes in this
portfolio. This is clearly a partial equilibrium view, since it ignores the
responses and incentives of those who invent projects. In a more general
equilibrium view, which we explore in this section, we explicitly take such
responses into account.
There are many ways to represent the incentives which influence
inventors'behavior, the constraints which inventors face, and how these two
aspects are related to the relevant features of the alternative economic
systems. Whatwe emphasize here is the commonly observed fact that the
acceptance of an idea or invention is often the most significantreward to its
inventor,and that inventors would attempt to invent those projects which have
greater chances of being accepted in an economic system.
Specifically, we assume that the gain to an inventor from a project
—17—depends on whether the project is accepted or not. The utilities to an
inventor from an accepted arid a rejected project are denoted by U and U
respectively, where UaUand U's are exogenous paraaeters.'6 We make
this assumption partly for simplicity, but it is also true that, in the
present problem, pecuniary reward to inventors can be linked only tenuously
with the actual values of projects.17
We visualize the project creation process as follows. There are a large
number of inventors. Each of them selects a technology of invention from a
family of such technologies. A particular technology determines the number of
projects which will be generated, and it also determines the statistical
distribution from which these projects would be drawn. If inventors are
identical then, in a symmetric equilibrium, they will choose the same
technology and the resulting collection of projects will constitute the
initial project portfolio.
One can therefore represent the inventor's choice as being exercised
through parameters (N, ),whereN is the number of projects and the vector
influences the pdf of the initial project portfolio. The pdf, thus, is
represented as g(x, ).Themaximand of inventors can then be written as
(19) N[JUfSg(x, )dx +fUr(1
—fS)g(x,8)dx,
which can be rearranged in a simpler form as
(20) Nti5 +NU
where U =U/(U—U),and n5 =ff5g(x,B)dx.
—18—A heuristic way to interpret the above expression is as follows:
Inventors gain a bonus of one dollar for each project selected andafixed fee
of U dollars for each project invented. Twospecialcases are worth noting.
If there is no fixed fee (that is, Ur +0,and the second term in (20) drops
out) then the inventors maximizethenumber of projects selected. On the
other hand, if there is no bonus (that is, Ua =Urand only the second term
in (20) matters) then the inventors maximize the number of projects
invented. These responses are in accord with the intuition.
Further, the combinations of N and that can be chosen is restricted by
what is feasible. We represent the technological feasibility as
(21) (N, )eT
where T is the technologically feasible set of N and the elements of 18
Maximization of (20), under theconstraint(21) on the choice variables,
yieldsNs andwhich, in turn, characterize the initial portfolio of
projects available to each of the two systems.
B. TwoTypesof Projects
Inthis case, the inventors' choice variables are the numbers of good and
bad projects, which are denoted by N1 and N2. From (20), the maximand of
inventors in the system s is
(22) (f N1 ÷ f N2) +(N1
+
inwhich recall that f and f are respectively the probabilities that a good
—19—and a bad project will be accepted in the system. These probabilities are
related to the screening probabilities, p1 and p2 ,through(1) and (2).
Further, the constraint (21) can now be represented in a simple form as
(23) N2 =N2(N1).
Clearly, we need to consider only those cases in which there is a trade—off
between N1 and N2otherwise the two systems have identical initial
portfolios.




+U)/(f+U).The above maximand implies thatthenumber
ofgood projects in a polyarchy is larger (or smaller) than that in a
hierarchy if F1' is greater (or smaller) than FH. To examine this issue









Now, recall that p1 > p2 > 0. Therefore, the expression (25) is
positive if: 1 > p1 +p2,thatis, the screening probabilities fall in the
region OADofFigure 4, and if




—20—Therefore, the initial portfolio in a polyarchy contains a larger number
ofgood projects (compared to that in a hierarchy) ifthe screening of
projectsistight and discriminating, and if the fixed gains to inventors from
the invented projects are significant (so that (26) is satisfied). The
reverse holds if the above conditions are not satisfied.'9
IV. RATIONAL SCREKNINC RULES
A. Determinants of Screening Rules
Althoughthereare manypossiblesources of error in screening, the one
on whichwefocus here isthat dueto errors in the assessment of the value of
projects. Weposit that the observationson thevalueof projects are
contaminatedby random errors, such that a perfect inference isnot
possible.If the observations which an evaluator makeson a project with
profit x are represented by y, then
(27) y=y(x,0)
where0 represents random errors. The screening rule then is a binary
function (accept or reject) of observations y.
Inaddition,the screening rules will depend on the nature of information
flowswithin economic systems. For example, if firms ia a polyarchy do not
share information, then a firm can not distinguish between the projects which
are being evaluated for the first time from those projects which were rejected
by the other firm.20 A firm, therefore, will use the same screening rule for
—2 1—all projects that it receives.
On the other hand, if firms provide to one another their own observations
ontheprojects which they reject, then they might use two screening rules:
one for the projects being evaluated for the first time and another for the
rest of the projects. In fact, the same could happen even at an intermediate
level of information flow in which firms label their rejected projects.
It is important to note here that the architecture of the economic system
itself conveys some information to its constituents, which they will use in
setting Bayesian decision rules. For example, even when there is no
information sharing, the two firms would not act independently, since each
firm knows that someofthe projects it receives are those rejected by the
other firm and, consequently, the portfolio of projects faced by a firm is not
a replica of the initial portfolio, but it has been modified by the other
firm.
Similarly,ina hierarchy, an important question is whether the upper
bureau uses the entire information collected in the organization (i.e.,
observations madebyboth bureaus) in its own screening rule,orthat only a
part of the entire information is available at the top. In the case of no
information sharing between the bureaus, the upper burea&s screening will be
based on its owninformation,and on the knowledge of howtheportfolio has
been modified by the lower bureau, but not on what value was observed by the
lower bureau for a particular project.2'
In the section below we examine the case in which there is noinforaation sha-
ring between screens in either of the two economic systems. This is partly
for simplicity, but it also represents a base case which brings out the trade—
of fs which would remain important regardless of the nature of information
—22—flows.
B. cut—off Levelsfor Observed Project Values
Projectevaluators often use cut—off levels for screening; a project is
accepted if its observed profit is above the cut—off level, and it is rejected
otherwise. Suppose that every screen makes one scalar observation; that the
errors in the observations made by different screens are identically and
independentlydistributed; and that errors are additive,22 i.e.,
(28) y(x, 8) =+8.
Denotethe pdf of 0by£(0), and the corresponding cdf by L(8). Then
(29) p(x, R) =Prob[y(x,8) > RI =1—L(R—x),and
(30) P(c) = = £(R—x)￿0,
where
In a polyarchy, denote the two firms by superscripts i and j, such that
i, j=1and 2; and i * .IfR' is the cut—off level for firm i, then
p1p(x, R1) denotes the corresponding screening fuaction. For firm i,
then, the probability that a given project with profit x Willarriveto be
evaluatedfor the first time is 1/2, and the probability that the sameproject
will arrive after being rejected from firm jis(1 —p3)/2.Sincethese two
kindsof arrivals can not be distinguished, the probability that a given
(undifferentiated)project with value x will arrive at firm I is
—23—4(2 —pi),and the probability that it will be selected is f p1(2 —pi).
The expected profit of firm I is23
(31) 4iP 4 E[xp1(2 —
inwhich we have suppressed the number of initial projects, N.
The firms maximize the above with respect to R1, taking R as given. En
a symmetric equilibrium, the optimal R1 and will, be the same, which we
¶ II P — - — . I -. - fl P —— ., — =C— — — aenoteDtc •me unique inLernai Optimum,LtLb UUt..LUU itom
(32) E[xpR(2 —p)]= 0
1 2 In a hierarchy, let R and R denote thecut—offlevels for the lower
and upper bureau respectively. The profit is represented as
H 12
(33) = E[xp p
Its derivatives with respect to Vs are
(34) = E[xpp3],
fori = 1and2.
Now,from (33), remains unchanged if R' and R2 are interchanged by
one another. It follows therefore that if the optimal cut—of f levels are
unique, then a hierarchy uses the same cut—off level in both bureaus.24
Denote this cut—off point by RH.If this optimum is internal, then it is
—24—characterized by
(35) E[xppRl
Selection Externality: Consider for a nEment, a hypothetical situation
in which the cut—off levels for firms in a polyarchy are belug set to maximize
the economy's total profit. In this case, (31) is maximized with respect to
and R. Call this the 'social optimum'. Clearly, this optimum will
entail, in general, different cut—off points than what independentfirmswould
set; for example, in the optimum derived earlier. Also,thelevel of profit
in the economy will be higher (or at. least no smaller) in the social optimum
than in the private optimum. What we note then, is that the selection of
projects in a polyarchy might generate an externality, although the firms are
identical (even concerning the information they have).25 This externality
could prevent the firms from using those screening rules which maximize the
economy's profit. In contrast, there is no selection externality in a
hierarchy; since the optimal screening rules maximize the economy's profit.
—25—C. TwoTypes ofProjects
Consider a portfolio consisting of two types of projects. Denote the
(random) observations on good and bad projects by y1 and y2 .Ageneral
property of cut—off points is seen as follows. Suppose for a nment that the
cut—off point R in a screen is set at the highest observation that a bad
project can yield, i.e., R =maxy2 .Then,the screen will block the bad
projects completely, though several good projects might be rejected as a
consequence. It is obvious that there Is no gain in setting the cut—off point
at a level higher than max y2, since by doing so one losies additIonal good
projects, without affecting bad projects (which are not being selected in any
case).
By a similar logic, itis never advantageous toset R below the lowest
observationthat a good project can yield, at which level all good projects
are accepted.26 Thus
(36) maxy2>R>rniny1
Thetrade—off within the above range of R is obvious: A. higher cut—off level
leads to fewer bad projects being accepted, but also to moregoodprojects
beingrejected. Forbrevity, we refer to the upper and lover limit in (36) as
the highest and the lowest cut—off points.
In Appendix II, we have derived explicit solutions for symmetric
projects, i.e., x1 =x2
=x,when the observation errors are uniformly
distributed with mean zero. The qualitative results are summarized below:
(i) A lower (higher) proportion of good projects in the initial
portfolio corresponds to a tighter (slacker) screening lUbothsystems. For
—26—instance, if the proportion of good projects is greater than two—thirds, then
both systems adopt the lowest cut—off level, ensuring that no good project is
rejected.This certainly implies a significant probability of accepting a bad
project, but this screening rule is optimal since there are fewer bad projects
in the initial portfolio.
(ii) The screening rule in a polyarchy is more conservative than that in
a hierarchy. For example, if the proportion of good projects is less than
one—half, then a polyarchy adopts the highest cut—off level, ensuring that no
bad project is selected, even though it loses many good proJects by adopting
this screening rule. In contrast, a hierarchy never finds it optimal to adopt
the highest cut—off level.
(iii) A polyarchy has a higher (lower) profit than a hierarchy if the
proportion of good projects in the initial portfolio is less (more) than one—
half. Obviously, if one hypothesizes (as we did earlier) that unprofitable
ideas typically outnumber the profitable ones in a portfolio, then the present
model predicts that a polyarchy is a superior institutional arrangement. This
result can be understood in two parts. First, as noted above, a small
proportion of good projects prompts the decision makers to set tighter
screening rules. Second, according to the intuition developed earlier in the
paper, tighter screening implies a relatively better performance in a
polyarchy.
V. CONCLUDINGRENARKS
Inthis paper, we have proposed a typology of economic systems based on
howtheir constituents are arranged together. We have compared the
—27—performance of polar economicsystems(decentralized versus centralized)27.
Errors inindividuals' judgment, which are an inescapable feature of human
decision making, play a key role in our analysis; since how mistakes add up in
aneconomic system depends critically onhow individual decision making units
areorganized together.
We began this paper by assuming that the nature of individuals' errors is
similar in the two different architectures under examination, and focused our
attentionon what these errors imply for systems' performance. Subsequently,
•i..._ .+-.. ,... 1Ai-cc.-. we .euw.lw LILC LL l_UI.IJJ. CI. I. '.JI. .
betweenthe two systems, when individuals use optimal decision rules based on
theinformation available to them.
There are other important reasons as well why the nature of errors
associated with different architectures may differ. For instance, it is
widely believed that the quality of decision making (i.e., who does what)
varies greatly across organizations; some individuals are better able to
screen projects than others. Two questions that can then be posed are: (i)
How does a system's performance depend on the assignment of individuals of
different abilities to different positions within the system, and (ii) How are
these decisions affected by the system's architecture.
Decisions about who is to occupy what position within an organization are
usually made by other individuals within the system, and these decisions are
affected, in turn, by factors which are similar to those which affect
decisions on projects. Thus, the architecture of economic systems affects the
quality of those who make judgments about people as well as about projects.
This provides a basis for analyzing the ru1es of succession, and what we
call (in Sah and Stiglitz (1984b)) the self—perpetuating aspects of economic
—28—sys terns.
Another characteristic of economic systems which affects their
performance is the nature of rewards and punishments meted out to the decision
makers. Thishas, of course, been thequestion around which much of the
recent literature on incentives has focused. In the present paper we have not
emphasized this aspect as much as it deserves.28 This, however, is not
because we think that incentive problems are unimportant, but because we think
that some of them are rather well understood in the literature, and the new
aspects upon which we focus here (for example, aggregation of errors) have
received insufficient attention.
Onthe other hand, we should point Out that the architecture of a system
may be critical in determining what incentivestructures are feasible. For
example, in a hierarchical structure, promotions constitute an important part
of the rewards, a kind of reward which may not always be desirable in a
polyarchy. On the other hand, in polyarchical structures, several parallel
units perform similar functions, and it is possible to devise reward
structures, based on relative performance. These reward. struictures have a
number of desirable properties concerning incentive, risk, and flexibility,29
and these may not be feasible in a hierarchical system. Different
architectures may also differ in the degree of individual accountability which
isfeasible within them. One criticism of modern bureaucracies is, for
example, that collective decision makingmakesitdifficultto reward and
punishbureaucrats individually.
Although we have motivated the present analysis in the context of
economic systems, our approach also has implications for the economics of
internal organizations. There are two main differences.First, certain kinds
—29—of externalities (such as the selection externality we pointed out earlier)
mightbeinternalized by a corporation in setting its internal rules. Second,
ifone internal architecture is better than another (based on whatever the
corporate criterion might be), then one might expect a corporation to adopt
thebetter architecture.3° Whether a similar response arises in an economic
system is not obvious, since the theories of societal response have not
reached the same level of articulation as those of corporate response.
Moreover, the problems of the design of economic systems are so complex
thatit might not bereasonable to expect that one would find the best of all
possible systems. The analogy to computer architecture is then suggestive:
the standard question in this case is not to find the best architecture,
since it is nearly impossible to find it, but to analyze the properties of
alternative structures, with a view to making some possible improvements.
The architecture of an economic system affects the behavior of the
organization in other ways as well; some of which have bea the subject of
extensive study outside economics. Social psychologists thave emphasized, for
example, that an individual's behavior may differ if he has participated in
the decision. making process compared to when he has been ordered to undertake
a particular task. Though these aspects of human behaviar have not
traditionally been incorporated into economic analysis, if they are important
determinants of economic behavior, e.g., of the effort exerted by individuals
or of the quality of their decision making, then they should be.
Theabovediscussion is by no means exhaustive. Yet, it is clear that to
pursueall, or even afew, of these facets simultaneously would be nearly
impossible. We have chosen, therefore, to examine a few limited aspects in
thepresentpaper, and have attempted topursue other important facets in our
subsequentresearch.
—30—Appendix I
Proportion of Projects Accepted: A direct evaluation of a5 based on (I),
(2), (3), and (6) yields
(Al) n =p(2—p)—p2a2 ,and
H 222 —
Itis obvious that
(A3) > < 0, and > 0.
Further, substitution of (6) in (8) leads to
(A4) p(l —p)> pø
Expressions (Al) and (A2), in conjunction with (A4), yield the following
bounds on as
(A5) p(2 -p)> n > p, and
(A6)
Expected Profit: From (1),(2), (4), and (6), we obtain the followingexpressions:
(A7) =[(2— —22 +[2(1— 2 2 3
p a ÷ p a n], x x
H 222 223
I+ [2pp a (A8) = ÷ a — ani, and
2 2
[(1 )
2+ pa ]+ 2N (A9) =2Nii[p(1 —
sinceY=N(—




-s—-->o -i---—<0, and i—>0, provided p <
The derivatives of with respect to the parameters can be signed
directly. Signing the derivatives of is easier if (A4) is used.APPENDIX II





Theconstant Nx can be dropped from (A12) since .t does t play anyrolein
the analysis below. Now, since the two firms in a polyarchy set the same cut-
off point; from (1), =k2
—k'
for k =1and 2. Also, it turns out in
the present case that the two bureaus itt a hierarchy set the same cut—off
level. Thus, from (2), f =p
.Further,from (29),
p1 =1—L(R—x),and p2=1—L(R+ x).
Using these expressions, the internal optima in a polyarchy and a






a£(R—x) 1 —L(R+ x)
1—a2.(R+x)=1—L(R—x)
Further, if the left hand side exceeds the right hand sidein theabove
expressions,then the cut—off level is at the lower corner of (36). If the
opposite is true, then the cut—off level is at the upper corner.
The observation errors are uniformly distributed with mean zero. Thatis: — , foru > 0 > —u; and 9.= 0,otherwise. From (36),
therefore, the range of R is: —x+u> R > x —u.Let S =x/u.Clearly,
6 is less than one from the last inequality, and it is positive. We find
that in a polyarchy








(A17) =—x+u,and =6a(2—8),If a <
2
In a hierarchy, on the other hand, the optimum is described as
(A18) RH x —u,and =a—(1—cz)(1—6)2, >,and
(A19) = — , andH 62a(2a2 3a +1)1(1—2cx)2,otherwise.
Note the following sufficient conditions concerning the cut—off points.
According to (A15) and (A17), a polyarchy uses the lowest cut—off point if
a > 2/3, and it uses the highest cut—off point if a < 1/2. A hierarchy, on
the other hand, uses the lowest cut—off point (see (A18)) if a > 1/2, but it
never uses the highest cut—off point. Also, it is obvious from the above
expressions that the cut—off point is raised in both systems (either
continuously, or in steps, depending on the region of a) if a goes down.The relative profit level is calculated as tY =Y1'— Takethe
range: 0 < a < (1 —5)1(2—). Inthis range, expressions (A17) and (A19)
hold, and Y =a(2—— ), where =(2a2 —3c& + 1)1(1—2a)2.
Further, in the present range of a,is an increasing function of a.
Evaluatingat a =(1—5)/(2—), wefind that =1/ES.Consequently,
Y > 0 within this range of a.
Next take the range:
2
> a >= .InthIs range, (A17) and
(A18) hold, and Y =(12a)(1 — Thus,tY0, ii1/2a. Within
the remaInIng range of a, (A18) holds for a hIerarchy, whereas (115) and
(A16) hold for a polyarchy, and it turns out that LY < L Therefore, the
result: Y 0 if 1/2a applIes to the entire range of a.FOOTNOTES
1.In fact, quite the contrary view has frequently been put forward: the
Lange—Lerner—Taylorequivalence theorem, for example, argues that a
marketeconomy and a bureaucratic economy using a price system behave in
an essentially identical manner. See Hayek (1935), Lange and Taylor
(1964), MIses (1935), among others, on this issue.
2.Of course, this is not the only useful typology. We discuss so other
typologies later.
3.We assume that the projects are being evaluated sequentially. The
probability of a project being accepted in a polyarchy remains the same,
however, even if the projects are being evaluated simultaneously. (An
exampleof simultaneous screening is the evaluation of manuscripts by
publishers, in contrast to the sequential evaluation of maauscripts by
journal editors.) What differs in these two cases is the cost of
evaluation, and the time taken in decision making.
4.This scai.ar valuation takes into account all of the relevant benefits and
costs. Also, we are assuming that the inter—project externalities are
not significant (that is, the value of one project does notdepend
significantly onwhether some other projectsare undertaken or not), and
thatthere is no restrictiononthe number of projects that can be
undertaken.Ofcourse, this model is not the only one which can be used
tocompare alternative economic systems. We have investigated two other
formulations. In the first, only a fixed number of projects can beundertaken, e.g., due to a fixed supply of investment capital, and the
projectevaluators' attempt to select the best projects. Inthe second,
thenumberof evaluators is fixed, and we determine the best way of
organizing them. See Sah and Stiglitz (1984a).
5.We are assuming that the screening functions corresponding to the two
screenswithin a system are identical. This allows usto focus on the
effectof architecture; also, as we shall see in Section IV, this turns
out to be the case when optImal screening rules are deterrnined In a
variety of circumstances.
6.There is not muchpointin considering portfolios which contain only
profitable projects, or only unprofitable projects. It is highly
unlikely that real world portfolIos have such features. In any event, if
there are such portfolios, and if project evaluators knowtherelevant
feature, then the issue of screening disappears altogether.
7. We are abstracting from the screening costs which may differ in the two
systems. See footnote 24, however, on this issue.
8. The last condition merely rules out those uninteresting cases in which
all projects are either accepted, or rejected.
9. The only uncertainty in the present model is in project acceptance. See
Sah and Stiglitz (1984a) for a discussion of project uncertainty and some
of its implications.10. We also assume that the end—points of the projects' distribution are
fixed.
11. That is:G(x) < (>) 0, with strict inequality holding for at least
some x, implies an improvement (worsening) in the sense of first—order
stochastic dominance. And:fCG(z)dz < (>) 0, with strict inequality
holding for at least some x, implies an improvement (worsening) in the
sense of second—order stochastic dominance.
12. The center of these hyperbolas is p1 =1/2,and p2 =1/2,as is evident
in Figure 4. The slopes of their asymptotes are +[ax1/(1
—
cL)x2]1'Z.
For a hyperbola like OEA, the length of the transverse axis (which is




corresponding length for a hyperbola like AFB is
[ja x1 —(1—
c1)x2}/4cxx1]1a'2.The special case in which =x2follows
from these expressions.
13. The same approach is useful even when the initial portfolios differ in
the two systems. Take the general case in which, for i =1and 2, N is
the number of projects, and x is the (positive number) denoting the
profit or loss from a project of type i in the system s. Then the center
PP P P 1111
of hyperbolas is given byp N. x1/[N. x. +Nixi.Other relevant
details can be readily worked out.
14. The expressiotsin Appendix I can also be used to ascertain the impact on
profit (in each of the two systems) of changes in the initial portfolio
(as reflected in the changes in the first three moments, since these are
the only relevant parameters), and in the screening function. Sah andStiglitz (1983) derive several propositions on the above comparative
statics. For brevity, we do not discuss these results here.
15. Explicit expressions for It can easily be derived. Qualitatively, many
of the properties of the mean aresimilarto tho8e of expected profit.
See SahandStiglitz (1983) for detailed results on the mean and the
varianceof final portfolios.
16. The assumption that U U is consistent with there being higher
pecuniaryrewards to inventors from anaccepted project than from a
rejectedproject.It is also consistent with the common observation that
inventors partly measure their success in non—pecuniary terms (such as
prestige), so that an accepted project is more desirable than a rejected
project,even ifthe financial rewardsare independent of project
acceptance. The assumption that U's are exogenous parameters implies
that the inventors' effort is not significantly sensitive to the
parameters of their choice. Also, we assume that thefinancialrewards
are negligibly small compared to the (net) profit in a system. These
assumptions can be relaxed byendogenizirig inventors' efforts and the
pecuniaryrewards.
17. Such a link is nearly impossible forprojects which are rejected, since
itis difficult to ascertain the profit from a project which has never
beenundertaken. Even for the projects which are accepted, the actual
values are knownmuchlater in timethan when the decisions are made.
Moreover,the actual outcomes of accepted projects are often contaminated
by other factors over whichinventors of projects have little or nocontrol. Even then, somedependencebetween pecuniary rewards to
inventors and the actual values of accepted projects. might be desirable
if monitoring costs are small and if there are no impediments to
arbitrarily complex contracts. Also, itispossible to link the rewards
tothe (ex—ante) observed values of projects. A full analysis of such
incentiveschemes, however, is not attempted in the present paper.
18. If there is a possibility of significant variation ifithelevel of
effort, then there would be one such constraint for each level of effort.
19. Depending on parameters of the function (23) and on what the magnitude of
U is, one can demarcate the space of acceptance probabilities
(p1 and p2) into regions in which one system has a higher or lower
profit than another. See Footnote 13.
20. It is assumed, however, that a firm has the information whether a project
was evaluated earlier by them or not, and the firm uses this information
to prevent a project from being evaluated more than once.
21.Which one ofthe possible information flows actually exists would depend
onthecosts involved. In addition, information is often contaminated in
the process of transfer. (Not only is it generally difficult for one
individual to communicate to another all that he knows, but also thete
are incentive problems associated with whether it is in his interest to
do so). These factors are important in both polyarchies and
hierarchies. It is not obvious, therefore, that informationsharing is
more easily achieved within a bureaucracy than among business firms, as
issometimes believed.22. Each one of these aspects can be generalized and can be made
endogenous. The number of observations, for example, would depend on the
cost and the technology of observation making.
23. A more complete determination of screening rules will, of course, take
into account itS impact on the incentives of inventors. For brevity, we
do not present here the details of such an analysis.
24. Obviously, this might notholdif screening costs are significant, since
H 12 1 - inthis case: E[xp p ]— CE[pI— C, whereC s the cost of
evaluating a project. We discuss the implications of evaluation costs in
Sah and Stiglitz (1984a).
25. Some aspects of this externality are parallel tothosearising in the
contextof screening and sorting. Also, note that the statements
concerning screening externalities will hold in nre general models as
well.
26. If y1and y2 do not overlap, i.e., if mm y1 > maxy2,
then the
decision problem disappears. This is because one can achieve perfect
selection by selecting any R in the non—overlapping region. We do not
concern ourselves with situations in which perfect laference is possible.
27. The nature of questions in which we are interested are not new. Ever
since Plato (1968) stated the problem of defining a typology of
alternative state systems, and that of comparing them, these questionshave been the centers of controversial debates in the literature on
political theory. See Popper (1950) for an appraisal of some of the
earlier literature concerning state systems. The differences between our
approach and the approaches taken in the political theory literature are
briefly sketched in Sah and Stiglitz (1984c).
28. For example, our model for determining screening rules can be extended to
include the possible effect of individuals' effort on errors, and the
ffürt—reward trade off whicth is optimal in eanh of the two systems.
Note, however, that the incentive structure maynotalways affect
individuals' performance; it may not take much more effort to make a good
decision than a bad one, but it maytakemuchmoreabilFty.
29. See Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).
30. We have examined here only twopolararchitectures. Moregenerally,
organizations (as well as economic systems) combine hierarchical and
polyarchical features. Committees with alternative voting rules and
different information structures are simple, but important, examples.
Also note that the problem of finding the "best" architecture (given
exogenous parameters) is methodologically the san as the one of
comparing alternative architectures (which we have adopted in this
paper); though, in certain circumstances, it might be possible to use
standard optimization techniques by positing parametrically defined
architectures.RBFEENES
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